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The guarantee of equal protection of the laws extends to women as well
as men. Yet for the first 100 years of the Fourteenth Amendment’s life, the
Supreme Court never found a law unconstitutional on the grounds that it
discriminated on the basis of sex. Between 1970 and 1980, social movement
advocacy and brilliant litigation by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and others changed
our constitutional law. 1 Cases beginning with Reed v. Reed 2 demonstrated
that in important respects, sex was like race: familiar justifications for
excluding women rested on stereotypes that denied individuals the
opportunity to compete and relegated women to secondary status in
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1 For an important forthcoming account of the role that Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
arguments on stereotyping played in the emergence of modern sex discrimination law,
see Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination
Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). For an examination of movement arguments
in popular, legislative, and judicial arenas that shaped the early sex discrimination cases,
see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J.
1943, 1984–2004 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel]; Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto
ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1366–1414 (2006) [hereinafter Siegel, Constitutional
Culture]; discussion infra Part III.
2 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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American society. 3 Over the course of the decade, the Court extended the
anti-stereotyping principle from discrimination on the basis of race to
discrimination on the basis of sex.
But fidelity to the principle had its limits. In 1974, in Geduldig v. Aiello,
the Court upheld a California law that provided workers comprehensive
disability insurance for all temporarily disabling conditions that might
prevent them from working, except pregnancy. 4 Although the plaintiff
argued that “[a]s with other types of sex discrimination, discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy often results from gross stereotypes and generalizations
which prove irrational under scrutiny,” 5 and although the Court
acknowledged that pregnancy discrimination might “effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other,” 6 the Geduldig
Court upheld the exclusion, reasoning that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy was not necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex. 7 When the
Court tried to apply Geduldig’s rationale to federal employment

3 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982)
(“Although the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is
straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities
of males and females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective
itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.”); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89
(1979) (holding unconstitutional a policy granting government aid to the children of
unemployed fathers but not unemployed mothers, explaining that the presumption that
“the father has the ‘primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’ while the
mother is the ‘center of home and family life,’” is “part of the ‘baggage of sexual
stereotypes,’” and not a legitimate ground for government-imposed sex classifications
(citations omitted)); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (“Legislative classifications
which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of
reinforcing the stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women and their need for special
protection.”); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (characterizing as an invalid
basis for state action “increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of
females in the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ideas’”); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“There can be no doubt that
our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally,
such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.” (footnote omitted)). See
generally PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 1213–19
(5th ed. 2006) (discussing these cases).
4 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974).
5 Brief for Appellees at 24, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640); see also Brief
Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 9, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484
(No. 73-640) (submitted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Nancy E. Stanley and arguing that
“[t]he mythology of pregnancy, however, has resisted rational inspection”).
6 417 U.S. at 496–97 n.20.
7 See infra notes 12, 78 & accompanying text.
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discrimination law in General Electric Corp. v. Gilbert, 8 Congress rejected
the Court’s reasoning and enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),
defining discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as discrimination on the
basis of sex. 9
Enactment of the PDA, however, did not change the Court’s approach to
the Constitution—at least not immediately. Supreme Court decisions of the
1970s do not closely scrutinize the regulation of pregnant women to
determine whether such regulation is shaped by gender bias. 10 For this
reason, there seems to be little connection between the constitutional sex
discrimination case law and Roe v. Wade’s holding that states may not
criminalize abortion. 11
Why do the 1970s cases not fully integrate pregnancy regulation into the
equal protection framework? Geduldig reasons that laws classifying on the
basis of pregnancy do not classify on the basis of sex because many—but not
all—women bear children. 12 Other cases view pregnancy as representing the

8 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (holding that a disability benefit plan excluding
disabilities related to pregnancy was not sex-based discrimination within the meaning of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.).
9 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (“The terms
‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes . . . .”). For the debates leading to the PDA’s enactment,
see Post & Siegel, supra note 1, at 2012–13. Concerns about sex stereotyping played a
significant role in Congress’s decision to amend Title VII. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95948, at 3 (1978) (“[T]he assumption that women will become [pregnant] and leave the
labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is at the root of the
discriminatory practices which keep people in low-paying and dead-end jobs.”).
10 See Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 267–80
(1992) (discussing “physiological naturalism” in equal protection and due process
doctrine of the period) [hereinafter Siegel, Reasoning].
11 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
12 Laws burdening pregnant employees harm only female employees, but the Court
emphasized that they potentially benefit a group that includes employees of both sexes:

The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this
insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program
divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of
both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members
of both sexes.

417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974)
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most fundamental sex difference. 13 According to these cases, society is
justified in treating pregnant women differently than others for reasons of
self-interest (to save money), 14 or for reasons of altruism (to protect the
unborn). 15 The cases do not seriously explore the possibility that traditional
sex-role stereotyping shapes judgments about functional rationality or
altruism where matters of pregnancy are concerned.
In short, the Court’s 1970s cases hold that the antistereotyping principle
constrains laws that classify by sex, but do not find the principle violated
where government regulates pregnancy. Our Essay unsettles this familiar
story by making three points.
First, we show that in the 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the women’s
movement argued that the antistereotyping principle applied to pregnancy;
the movement viewed the regulation of pregnant women as a paradigmatic
site of sex-role stereotyping. Second, we show that even though the Court
initially had difficulty seeing that sex role stereotypes were sometimes
implicated in cases concerning the regulation of pregnancy, the Court’s
constitutional decisions have increasingly come to recognize the relationship
between pregnancy discrimination and sex discrimination. Third, we suggest
that the Court and other constitutional interpreters should revisit Geduldig
and read the decision’s holding more precisely—and narrowly—as
recognizing that, while there are legitimate reasons for regulating pregnancy,
such regulation can be animated by invidious or traditionally stereotypical
judgments. This understanding has implications for both equal protection and
reproductive rights cases.

13 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 478 (1981) (Stewart, J.,

concurring) (“[T]here are differences between males and females that the Constitution
necessarily recognizes. In this case we deal with the most basic of these differences:
females can become pregnant as the result of sexual intercourse; males cannot.”).
14 See, e.g., Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 (noting that California has a legitimate
interest “in distributing the available resources in such a way as to keep benefit payments
at an adequate level for disabilities that are covered, rather than to cover all disabilities
inadequately,” and in “maintaining the contribution rate at a level that will not unduly
burden participating employees, particularly low-income employees who may be most in
need of the disability insurance”).
15 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (explaining that at viability, “the State’s important
and legitimate interest in potential life” becomes “‘compelling’” and therefore sufficient
to justify treating pregnant women differently, by abrogating their right to choose
whether to bear a child).
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I. PREGNANCY AND THE ANTISTEREOTYPING PRINCIPLE: THE 1970S
In the 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the women’s movement
challenged laws that imposed traditional sex roles on pregnant women. 16 We
discuss two legal documents of the era, each written in 1972. This was the
year the Equal Rights Amendment was sent to the states for ratification, and
when the women’s movement was still trying to persuade the Court to apply
heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the basis of sex.

A. Struck v. Secretary of Defense
The first document is a brief that Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote as general
counsel for the Women’s Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) in Struck v. Secretary of Defense. 17 Captain Susan Struck
was a career officer serving as a nurse in Vietnam who faced an involuntary
discharge under Air Force regulations then in effect because she was
pregnant. 18 Government regulations barred both pregnant women and
mothers from serving. 19 The only way for Struck to keep her job was to abort

16 Siegel, Constitutional Culture, supra note 1, at 1385–86 & nn.169–70 (discussing

feminists in the early 1970s who argued that, under the Equal Protection Clause and
federal employment discrimination law, regulation of pregnancy was sex-based and
wrongful when it enforced traditional stereotypes about women’s roles). A number of
decisionmakers responded favorably to this claim. For example, in 1972, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) ruled that disability relating to pregnancy
should be treated as any other disability at work. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973)
(providing that an employer’s general disability policies “shall be applied to disability
due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to
other temporary disabilities”). And courts began to recognize that mandatory discharge of
pregnant women violated equal protection. See Heath v. Westerville Board of Education,
345 F. Supp. 501, 505 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1972), which relied on Reed to invalidate
regulations requiring termination of employment at a fixed stage of pregnancy and
explained that the “defendant Board’s . . . treatment of pregnancy . . . is more a
manifestation of cultural sex role conditioning than a response to medical fact and
necessity. The fact that [the plaintiff] does not fit neatly into the stereotyped vision . . . of
the ‘correct’ female response to pregnancy should not redound to her economic or
professional detriment.”
17 See Brief for Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72178), 1972 WL 135840. For a detailed analysis of this brief and what it reveals about
Justice Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination, see generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B.
Siegel, Struck By Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
18 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 3.
19 Id. at 5. The regulation stated:

1100

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:4

the pregnancy. 20 No policies similarly required discharge of men who
fathered children while in the service. 21 Ginsburg’s 1972 brief challenged the
exclusion as a violation of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment,
insisting that government regulation of pregnant women was presumptively
unconstitutional when such regulation enforced the sex roles and stereotypes
of the separate-spheres tradition—the dyadic structuring of sex roles in
which men are expected to perform as breadwinners and women are expected
to perform as economically dependent caregivers. 22 Ginsburg argued that
“[s]ex discrimination exists when all or a defined class of women (or men)
are subjected to disadvantaged treatment based on stereotypical assumptions
that operate to foreclose opportunity based on individual merit,” and she
urged that the pregnancy regulation at bar should be subject to “close
scrutiny, identifying sex as a ‘suspect’ criterion for governmental
distinctions.” 23
Ginsburg identified discharge-for-pregnancy rules as a paradigmatic
form of the particular kind of sex-based differentiation the feminist
movement was challenging. 24 Her brief demonstrated that exclusion of

The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the least practical
delay when it is determined that one of the conditions in (a) or (b) below exist . . .
a. Pregnancy:
(1) General:
(a) A woman will be discharged from the service with the least practical
delay when a determination is made by a medical officer that she is
pregnant.

...
a. Minor Children:
(1) General: The commission of any woman officer will be terminated with the
least practical delay when it is established that she:

...
(d) Has given birth to a living child while in a commissioned officer
status.

Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Air Force
Regulation 36-12). A 1971 amendment to the regulation provided that “Discharge Action
will be cancelled if Pregnancy is Terminated.” Id. at 1376 (quoting Part I, C of 1971
Amendments to Regulations).
20 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 10.
21 Id. at 7.
22 Id. at 12–14.
23 Id. at 15, 26.
24 Ginsburg wrote:
In very recent years, a new appreciation of women’s place has been generated
in the United States. Activated by feminists of both sexes, legislatures and courts
have begun to recognize and respond to the subordinate position of women in our
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pregnant employees was sex-based state action that enforced traditional sex
roles. “Heading the list of arbitrary barriers that have plagued women
seeking equal opportunity is disadvantaged treatment based on their unique
childbearing function.” 25 Mandatory discharge of employees who became
pregnant not only inflicted substantial economic harm; it also imposed
traditional social roles on women. “[M]andatory pregnancy discharge,”
Ginsburg contended, “reinforces societal pressure to relinquish career
aspirations for a hearth-centered existence.” 26
To make visible the role-based assumptions the discharge rules enforced,
Ginsburg compared the government’s treatment of women in the service to
its treatment of men. She showed that the Air Force accommodated service
members temporarily disabled for reasons other than pregnancy, 27 and
affirmatively sought to retain men who became fathers. “[M]en in the Air
Force are not constrained to avoid the pleasures and responsibilities of
procreation and parenthood” 28 and “indeed additional benefits are provided
to encourage men who become fathers to remain in service.” 29 By contrast,
Ginsburg emphasized, Captain Struck “was presumed unfit for service under
a regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits into the
stereotyped vision of the correct female response to pregnancy.” 30
Ginsburg rejected the long line of cases that justified different treatment
of women as benign protection. Laws enforcing the sex roles of the separate
spheres tradition did not in fact protect women; they locked women in a
social order that denied them the opportunity to define themselves as
individuals and subordinated them by making them dependents and secondclass participants in core activities of citizenship. “[P]resumably wellmeaning exaltation of woman’s unique role in bearing children has, in effect,
denied women equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and
capacities and has impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in
society and the second-class status our institutions historically have imposed upon
them. The heightened national awareness that equal opportunity for men and women
is a matter of simple justice has led to significant reform . . . .

Id. at 26–27 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 34.
26 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 10; see also infra note 35.
27 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 17, at 23, 50.
28 Id. at 48.
29 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 55.
30 Id. at 50–51 (quoting Heath v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501,
506 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (internal quotation omitted); see also id. at 52 (“The
discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited
notion that a woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at
home to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care.” (footnote omitted)).
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society.” 31 Ginsburg thus argued that the Equal Protection Clause requires
government to give women equal freedom with men to define themselves.
The Struck brief challenged the mandatory discharge rule as violating
constitutional guarantees of privacy as well as equality. In a separate section,
Ginsburg urged that “[i]mposition of this outmoded standard upon petitioner
unconstitutionally encroaches upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her
personal life.” 32 Privacy doctrine protects the freedom to define one’s family
life that equal protection also protects when it prohibits government from
enforcing traditional sex roles on women.
Relying on Griswold v. Connecticut 33 and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 34
Ginsburg argued that Air Force policy enforced the “discredited notion that a
woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at
home to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care.” 35 In so
doing, the policy “substantially infring[ed] upon her right to sexual privacy,
and her autonomy in deciding ‘whether to bear . . . a child.’” 36 Ginsburg
cited a series of lower court opinions that understood Griswold and
Eisenstadt to protect decisions about abortion. 37 She thereby intimated that
the cases protecting women’s decisions whether to bear a child extend to
abortion—that those cases prohibit not only laws that require women to
continue a pregnancy, 38 but also laws that pressure women to end a
pregnancy, as did the Air Force regulation Struck challenged. 39
Ginsburg argued that the Constitution protected Struck’s decision about
how to reconcile work and family from government control on equal
protection, privacy, and free exercise grounds. Ginsburg thus showed how
31 See id. at 38–45 (discussing, inter alia, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961);
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872)).
32 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 52.
33 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 52 (footnote omitted).
36 Id. at 54 (quoting Baird, 405 U.S. at 453).
37 Id. at 54 n.55. Ginsburg explained that “Griswold alone, or in conjunction with
Baird, has been cited in numerous lower court decisions holding that women have a right
to determine for themselves, free from unwarranted governmental intrusion, whether or
not to bear children,” and listed the following cases as examples: Roe v. Wade, 314
F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Poe v. Menghini, 339 F. Supp. 986 (D. Kan. 1972);
Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972); and YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F. Supp.
1048 (D. N.J. 1972).
38 Notably, Ginsburg filed the Struck brief on December 4, 1972. Roe was handed
down on January 22, 1973.
39 See supra note 19 (quoting the Air Force regulation).
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the Air Force regulation subjected Struck to several constitutionally suspect
forms of pressure, concluding “that the challenged regulation operates with
particularly brutal force against women of [Captain Struck’s Roman
Catholic] faith.” 40 This was because “[t]ermination of pregnancy prior to the
birth of a living child was not an option [she] could choose.” 41 In sum, “the
regulation pitted her Air Force career against . . . her religious conscience.” 42
The Supreme Court never heard oral argument. During litigation, the Air
Force waived Captain Struck’s discharge, retreating from its policy of
automatically discharging women for pregnancy, 43 and Solicitor General
Erwin Griswold moved to dismiss the case as moot. 44 The Court elected to
vacate the judgment and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider
[the] issue of mootness in light of the position presently asserted by the
Government.” 45

B. Abele v. Markle
In the 1970s, the women’s movement challenged not only mandatory
discharge rules, but also laws criminalizing abortion as imposing sex roles on
women. 46 Feminists argued that “[r]estrictive laws governing
abortion . . . are a manifestation of the fact that men are unable to see women
40 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 56.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 We have not been able to determine why Griswold feared a Supreme Court

decision on the merits in Struck. We strongly suspect, however, that he perceived
governmental coercion of abortion as an inadvisable context in which to vindicate the
federal government’s asserted interests in the area of pregnancy discrimination. The
context of Struck was very much one of coercion. See, e.g., Janice Goodman, Rhonda
Copelon Schoenbrod & Nancy Stearns, Doe and Roe, Where Do We Go From Here?, 1
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 20, 35 (1973) (discussing Struck as a case arising “[i]n the area of
coercion”).
44 For Ginsburg’s response to the motion, see Opposition to Memorandum for the
Respondents Suggesting Mootness, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No.
72-178), 1972 WL 135842.
45 Struck, 409 U.S. at 1071.
46 On sex equality arguments for the abortion right in this era, see Reva B. Siegel,
Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving
Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 825 (2007) (“Whether making claims on
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or the Nineteenth Amendment,
briefs argued that criminal laws forcing pregnant women to bear unwanted children were
the expression of sex stereotyping and sex-role reasoning.”) [hereinafter Siegel, Sex
Equality Arguments]. See generally Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, On The Road to
Roe v. Wade: How Americans Talked About Abortion in the Years Before the Supreme
Court’s Landmark Ruling (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with author).
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in any role other than that of mother and wife.” 47 In Abele v. Markle, a suit
challenging Connecticut’s abortion law which Ginsburg cited in her Struck
brief, 48 one can see the antistereotyping principle applied to abortion laws.
What follows is an excerpt from a decision by Judge Edward Lumbard
striking down Connecticut’s statute. He wrote the opinion in 1972, the same
year as the Struck brief. The decision reasons about the unconstitutionality of
Connecticut’s abortion restrictions differently than the Court would a year
later in Roe:
The Connecticut anti-abortion laws take from women the power to
determine whether or not to have a child once conception has occurred. In
1860, when these statutes were enacted in their present form, women had
few rights. Since then, however, their status in our society has changed
dramatically. From being wholly excluded from political matters, they have
secured full access to the political arena. From the home, they have moved
into industry; now some 30 million women comprise forty percent of the
work force. And as women’s roles have changed, so have societal attitudes.
The recently passed equal rights statute and the pending equal rights
amendment demonstrate that society now considers women the equal of
men.
The changed role of women in society and the changed attitudes toward
them reflect the societal judgment that women can competently order their
own lives and that they are the appropriate decisionmakers about matters
affecting their fundamental concerns. 49

These brief paragraphs were penned the year before Justice Brennan
made the case for extending heightened scrutiny to sex discrimination in

47 Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers et al. at 24, Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40); see also CONGRESS TO UNITE WOMEN,
RESOLUTIONS FROM THE WORKSHOP ON REPRODUCTION AND ITS CONTROL (pamphlet)
(1969) (“We support the teaching of sex education to people of all ages, and demand that
this sex education include instruction in all aspects of birth control and EXCLUDE
instruction in so-called ‘sex roles.’”); Mary Daly, Sexist Ethics and Abortion, in Female
Liberation, The Right to Choose Abortion 21, 21 (1971) (“Writings on abortion by male
ethicists often give the illusion of ‘clarity’ because they concentrate upon some selected
facts or data, while failing to consider the social context of the abortion problem—the
assumptions, attitudes, stereotypes, customs, and arrangements which make up the fabric
of the world in which women actually live.”); WOMEN VERSUS CONNECTICUT 2–3
(pamphlet) (1970) (“We believe that women must unite to free themselves from a culture
that defines them only as daughters, wives and mothers. We must be free to be human
whether or not we choose to marry or bear children.”).
48 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at 54 n.55.
49 Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Conn. 1972) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
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Frontiero v. Richardson 50 and Justice Blackmun struck down Texas’s
abortion law in Roe. 51 In Abele, Judge Lumbard reasoned that constitutional
protection for women’s decision whether to abort a pregnancy was warranted
because of changing social views about women’s “status” and “roles.” 52 He
cited the Nineteenth Amendment’s conferring on women the right to vote;
Reed v. Reed, the first equal protection sex discrimination decision; Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (as amended in 1972, when Congress insisted
on equal enforcement of sex as well as race provisions of the federal
employment discrimination law); and the Equal Rights Amendment, which
had just been sent to the states. 53 Given changing social understanding of
women’s “status” and “roles,” 54 Judge Lumbard decided that the state’s
interest in protecting the unborn was not a sufficient reason to take away
from women all control over the decision whether to become a mother. 55
Suffice it to say, these are not the reasons or forms of authority to which
the Court appealed when it recognized women’s right to choose in Roe. 56
Supreme Court decisions of the 1970s did not closely scrutinize claims of
pregnancy discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, and failed to
recognize equal protection as a ground for the abortion right. But after some
thirty-five years of continuing argument—in the litigation of pregnancy
discrimination cases, in legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave

50 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion).
51 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
52 342 F. Supp. at 802.
53 Id. at 802 & nn.8–9. Judge Lumbard did not expressly cite the Equal Protection

Clause; instead, he cited Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the first equal protection
decision to strike down a law on the ground that it discriminates on the basis of sex—a
case briefed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See Reply Brief for Appellant, Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4).
54 Abele, 342 F. Supp. at 802.
55 Id. at 802–03.
56 The Roe Court more than once described the abortion right as residing with the
pregnant woman’s physician. The Court noted that for the period of pregnancy prior to
the “compelling” point, “the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free
to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be
effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.” 410 U.S. at 163. The Court
later explained that “[f]or the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.” Id. at 164. For other sources noting this point,
see Linda Greenhouse, How the Supreme Court Talks About Abortion: The Implications
of a Shifting Discourse, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 41, 45–46 (2008); Siegel, Reasoning,
supra note 10, at 273 n.43; Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims
That Engendered Roe (Mar. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Act (FMLA), 57 and in debate over abortion rights—the law is slowly
beginning to shift today.

II. INCREMENTAL CHANGE: EMERGENT ANTISTEREOTYPING
CONSTRAINTS ON THE REGULATION OF PREGNANCY
We will not attempt here to document exhaustively our claim that the
Court—as well as American society—has been proceeding on a path of
incremental change. Rather, we will identify two locations in Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine in which we can now see the antistereotyping principle
applied to the regulation of pregnancy.

A. Equal Protection
In 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist, on behalf of a six-Justice majority,
applied the antistereotyping principle to the regulation of pregnancy in
upholding the FMLA in Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs. 58 To demonstrate that Congress had power to enact the FMLA under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a remedy for violations of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Hibbs opinion discussed at length evidence
before Congress of equal protection violations that Congress could remedy
by enacting the FMLA. 59 Chief Justice Rehnquist reported that states often
gave leave to women only, but the extended time off for childbearing
included leave for early childcare that men, too, might have used for
parenting purposes. 60 Rehnquist observed:
Many States offered women extended “maternity” leave that far exceeded
the typical 4- to 8-week period of physical disability due to pregnancy and
childbirth, but very few States granted men a parallel benefit: Fifteen States
provided women up to one year of extended maternity leave, while only
four provided men with the same. This and other differential leave policies
were not attributable to any differential physical needs of men and women,
but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women’s work. 61

Where states offered female employees leave for “pregnancy disability”
that far exceeded the medically recommended pregnancy disability leave
57 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006).
58 538 U.S. 721, 724–25 (2003).
59 Id. at 730.
60 Id. at 731.
61 Id. (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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period of six weeks, the Court in Hibbs reasoned, “[t]his genderdiscriminatory policy is not attributable to any different physical needs of
men and women, but rather to the invalid stereotypes that Congress sought to
counter through the FMLA.” 62 The length of the “pregnancy disability”
leave reflected and enforced stereotypical assumptions about women’s
distinctive obligations as parents.
Quoting Congress, the Court observed: “Historically, denial or
curtailment of women’s employment opportunities has been traceable
directly to the pervasive presumption that women are mothers first, and
workers second. This prevailing ideology about women’s roles has in turn
justified discrimination against women when they are mothers or mothers-tobe.” 63 In this passage, the Court acknowledged what its earlier analysis
demonstrated and the women’s movement had long argued: that
unconstitutional sex stereotyping has shaped laws governing pregnant
women as well as new mothers. 64

B. Abortion Rights
Hibbs applied the antistereotyping principle to the regulation of
pregnancy. The same is true of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 65 the Court’s 1992 decision reaffirming Roe. The
joint opinion in Casey did not invoke equal protection as textual or doctrinal
authority for the abortion right, but it repeatedly invoked sex equality
concepts to explain the values the abortion right protects and to determine the
reach of the right. Consider the language in which the joint opinion
reaffirmed constitutional protection for the abortion right:

62 Id. at 733 n.6.
63 Id. at 736 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
64 Then Court then observed that sex-role stereotyping shapes the regulation of

men’s conduct as well as that of women:
Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are reinforced by parallel
stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. Because
employers continued to regard the family as the woman’s domain, they often denied
men similar accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These
mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination that
forced women to continue to assume the role of primary family caregiver, and
fostered employers’ stereotypical views about women’s commitment to work and
their value as employees. Those perceptions, in turn, Congress reasoned, lead to
subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis.

Id.
65 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her
spiritual imperatives and her place in society. 66

Precisely as it reaffirmed the abortion right, the joint opinion summoned
the understanding that the state cannot impose “its own vision of the
woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our
history and our culture.” 67 The opinion tied constitutional protection for
women’s abortion decision to the understanding, forged in the Court’s sex
discrimination cases, that government may not use law to enforce traditional
sex roles on women. 68 As one of us has written, the joint opinion expresses
“constitutional limitations on abortion laws in the language of [the Court’s]
equal protection sex discrimination opinions, illuminating liberty concerns at

66 Id. at 852.
67 Id.
68 In Casey, the Court invoked concerns about government enforcement of
traditional sex roles not only in explaining the rationale of the abortion right, but also in
explaining its reach. Casey struck down the spousal notice requirement of Pennsylvania’s
abortion law on the ground that it imposed traditional sex roles on women:

There was a time, not so long ago, when a different understanding of the family
and of the Constitution prevailed. In Bradwell v. State, three Members of this Court
reaffirmed the common-law principle that “a woman had no legal existence separate
from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the social
state . . . .” Only one generation has passed since this Court observed that “woman is
still regarded as the center of home and family life,” with attendant “special
responsibilities” that precluded full and independent legal status under the
Constitution. These views, of course, are no longer consistent with our
understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution. . . .
The husband’s interest in the life of the child his wife is carrying does not
permit the State to empower him with this troubling degree of authority over his
wife. The contrary view leads to consequences reminiscent of the common law. . . .
A State may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents
exercise over their children.
Section 3209 embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law
status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and
of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution. Women do not lose their
constitutionally protected liberty when they marry. The Constitution protects all
individuals, male or female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental
power, even where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of
the individual’s family.

Id. at 896–98 (citation omitted).
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the heart of the sex equality cases in the very act of recognizing equality
concerns at the root of its liberty cases.” 69
Justice Ginsburg quoted Casey’s sex equality reasoning in her dissent in
Gonzales v. Carhart. 70 But she went even further. Where Casey drew upon
sex equality principles to justify the abortion right—reasoning that
government may not use the power of the state to enforce traditional sex
roles on women—Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent added a discussion of
key equal protection sex discrimination precedents, including decisions
Justice Ginsburg litigated or wrote. 71 In her Carhart dissent, Justice
69 Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments, supra note 46, at 831.
70 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see, e.g., id. at 170 (“In

reaffirming Roe, the Casey Court described the centrality of ‘the decision whether to
bear . . . a child,’ to a woman’s ‘dignity and autonomy,’ her ‘personhood’ and ‘destiny,’
her ‘conception of . . . her place in society.’”(citations omitted)); id. at 171 (“As Casey
comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s ‘control
over her [own] destiny.’. . . Women, it is now acknowledged, have the talent, capacity,
and right ‘to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.’ Their
ability to realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately connected to
‘their ability to control their reproductive lives.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 172 (“[L]egal
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine
her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”); id. at 171 n.2 (“Casey
described more precisely than did Roe v. Wade the impact of abortion restrictions on
women’s liberty.” (citations omitted)); id. at 185 (citing Casey as evidence of the Court’s
repeated confirmation “that ‘[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped . . . on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.’”).
71 In objecting to the forms of woman-protective antiabortion arguments to which
the Carhart majority referred, Justice Ginsburg invoked both negative and positive equal
protection precedents—that is, the cases invalidated by modern understandings of sex
discrimination, as well as the equal protection decisions that reflect this new
understanding of women’s roles as citizens:
This way of thinking reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family
and under the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited. Compare,
e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422–423, 28 S. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908)
(“protective” legislation imposing hours-of-work limitations on women only held
permissible in view of women’s “physical structure and a proper discharge of her
maternal functio[n]”) and Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141, 21 L. Ed. 442
(1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and
defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife
and mother.”), with United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n.12, 116
S. Ct. 2264, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1996) (State may not rely on “overbroad
generalizations” about the “talents, capacities, or preferences” of women; “[s]uch
judgments have . . . impeded . . . women’s progress toward full citizenship stature
throughout our Nation’s history”), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207, 97
S. Ct. 1021, 51 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1977) (gender-based Social Security classification
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Ginsburg, joined in full by three other Justices, fused the normative power of
equality arguments with the textual authority of the Equal Protection Clause:
“[L]egal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek
to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a
woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal
citizenship stature.” 72 In responding to the majority’s discussion of womanprotective antiabortion argument, Justice Ginsburg reminded her audience of
Bradwell 73 and other precedents enforcing traditional sex roles that the
nation now repudiates. This audience includes Justice Kennedy, who enabled
Casey and who reaffirmed its framework and protection for second-trimester
abortions in Carhart. 74

rejected because it rested on “archaic and overbroad generalizations” “such as
assumptions as to [women’s] dependency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72 Ginsburg clarified the true stakes surrounding abortion-restrictive regulation of
women:
There was a time, not so long ago, when women were regarded as the center of
home and family life, with attendant special responsibilities that precluded full and
independent legal status under the Constitution. Those views, this Court made clear
in Casey, are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the
individual, or the Constitution. Women, it is now acknowledged, have the talent,
capacity, and right to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation. Their ability to realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is intimately
connected to their ability to control their reproductive lives. Thus, legal challenges
to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to
determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.

Id. at 171–72 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For an account of Justice
Ginsburg’s constitutional vision that centers on her commitment to equal citizenship
stature and explores the diverse doctrinal implications of this commitment, see generally
Neil S. Siegel, “Equal Citizenship Stature”: Justice Ginsburg’s Constitutional Vision in
President Obama’s America, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (symposium
honoring the jurisprudence of Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
73 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
74 In Carhart, Justice Kennedy applied Casey, which he understood to mandate
protection for the most common method of second-trimester abortion. What is more,
Kennedy did not understand the Court to be limiting a woman’s autonomy to decide
whether to have an abortion. Rather, he wrote as if the only question presented was the
method through which physicians would make the women’s decision effective. See Reva
B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1770–71 (2008).
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III. GEDULDIG IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
As we have seen, today there are both equal protection and substantive
due process decisions that apply the antistereotyping principle to laws
regulating pregnancy. These decisions reflect incremental—but cumulatively
substantial—changes in the way Americans view the relationship between
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and discrimination on the basis of
sex. 75 It is now time to reexamine the ways we read Geduldig v. Aiello. 76
Geduldig has long been read as a constitutional impediment to pregnancy
discrimination claims. 77 But what exactly did Geduldig say? We quote part
of Geduldig’s now infamous footnote 20:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
75 Consider, for example, the political impossibility of repealing the Pregnancy

Discrimination Act (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), which responded to Geduldig and
Gilbert. The Court recently discussed this case law and Congress’s responses to it in
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S. Ct. 1962 (2009). There the Court held that an employer
does not necessarily violate the PDA when it pays pension benefits based in part on an
accrual rule, applied only prior to the PDA’s enactment, that gave less retirement credit
for pregnancy leave than for medical leave generally. Id. at 1968. Only Justice Breyer
joined Justice Ginsburg’s passionate dissent, in which she described Gilbert as wrong the
day it was decided; she characterized the decision as “astonishing” and “aberrational,”
and stated that “this Court erred egregiously.” Id. at 1977, 1979 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
The other justices allowed AT&T to perpetuate pay differentials in the post-PDA period
that were attributable to pregnancy discrimination that occurred in the pre-PDA period.
Id. at 1966 (majority opinion). Tellingly, however, none of them defended Geduldig and
Gilbert’s reasoning. In essence, the majority reasoned that the employer’s discrimination
was reasonable when it occurred, even if it was no longer an acceptable way to treat
women. Ginsburg’s characterization of Gilbert provoked no defense of the decision from
any other Justice. This is in stark contrast to what commonly occurs when individual
Justices speak their minds forcefully in controversial areas of law. Both the narrow
holding and the loud silences in Hulteen suggest little enthusiasm on the Court for
defending the Geduldig/Gilbert view of the relation between pregnancy discrimination
and sex discrimination.
76 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
77 See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 751 (2003)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Geduldig for the proposition that “[o]ur cases make clear
that a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause by granting pregnancy disability
leave to women without providing for a grant of parenting leave to men”); Bray v.
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271 (1993) (noting that in Geduldig,
“we rejected the claim that a state disability insurance system that denied coverage to
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy [violated the Fourteenth Amendment].
‘While it is true,’ we said, ‘that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.’”
(citation omitted)).
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classification like those considered in [Reed and Frontiero]. Normal
pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique
characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are
mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to
include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this
on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition. 78

As the language of the Court’s opinion makes clear, Geduldig did not
hold that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is never discrimination on
the basis of sex; rather, Geduldig held that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is not always discrimination on the basis of sex. Far from
imposing a categorical bar to constitutional claims of pregnancy
discrimination, Geduldig acknowledged that “distinctions involving
pregnancy” might inflict “an invidious discrimination against the members of
one sex or the other.” 79 The Court concluded, however, that the principle
was respected in that case.
Geduldig did not recognize gender bias in the decision of the California
legislature to provide temporary disability insurance for most work-disabling
conditions except pregnancy. In the early 1970s, the Court viewed as rational
the legislature’s decision to save money by excluding the claims of new
mothers and mothers-to-be. 80 But over the course of the decade, not just the
feminist movement, but Congress itself condemned practices imposing
traditional sex-role constraints on pregnant women in the workplace. 81 With
the benefit of several decades of PDA litigation, the nation has come to
recognize that employment decisions that appear grounded in functional
rationality may instead reflect archaic and stereotypical conceptions of
women’s roles. If Geduldig recognized this possibility in principle, Hibbs
pronounced its violation in practice.
In the early 1970s, the Court prohibited abortion restrictions under the
Due Process Clause without exploring how criminal abortion statutes might
also violate principles of equal protection. But, over time equal protection
values have come to shape substantive due process law. Several passages of
Casey recognize that constitutional restrictions on abortion also protect
pregnant women against state action enforcing traditional conceptions of
women’s roles. In Carhart, four members of the Court directly invoke the

78 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 n.20 (1974).
79 Id.
80 See supra note 13 (quoting the Court’s reasoning).
81 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the PDA).

2009]

PREGNANCY AND STEREOTYPING

1113

authority of the Equal Protection Clause in reasoning about the
constitutionally of abortion-restrictive regulation.
Where the Court was once inclined to view the regulation of pregnant
women as presumptively benign, the Court is now more quick to recognize
constitutional concerns at stake in the law’s regulation of pregnant women.
Equal protection and due process law today require scrutiny of laws
governing pregnancy to ensure that exercises of public power aimed at
pregnant women, however benign in purpose, are not in fact shaped by
gender bias. What Geduldig anticipates in theory, Hibbs and Casey illustrate
in practice. As Justice Ginsburg’s Carhart dissent cautions, when regulation
of pregnant women reflects or enforces sex-role stereotypes of the separate
spheres’ tradition, the law may violate equal protection. 82

82 For development of this argument, see generally Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come
aLong Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1891–97 (2006).

